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Enrique Rattín

### CRISIS IN CULTURE

Psychoanalysis contributes to the study of the relationship of the subject with the intrinsic law to culture and the notion of social bond. The subject and the group of which they are part respond to the same rules of the game, but psychoanalysis is not the reproduction of a habitual social model. It implies the exploration of the otherness that lies in the core of culture. But the otherness which is known through psychoanalysis is filtered through the word and meets the unconscious as an effect of language. And in the field of that otherness, any opposition between reality and discourse can be as partial and ideological as an opposition between science (with its premises and achievements) and the unconscious (with its formations).

The unconscious and science have the same subject, one that is not grammatical, nor the first subject of the Cartesian cogito but the second: a subject trapped in the very socio-political matter of language. Lacan wrote it as \$, a subject barred by the signifier in culture. We cannot conceive unconscious representations in the same way, if we consider them at a collective level, as there is no collective subject to the enunciation. The unconscious of Freudian psychoanalysis treats a certain subject that does not lead to religious or ideological conceptions in which the identification with a leader would prevail in the register of the imaginary, leading to a totalitarian drift.

The man, as a speaking being, is doubly divided. He does not constrain merely to a being of nature, since on the one hand he is able to transcend himself to think, and on the other hand, he is divided by its uptake in terms of speech. While there is an ethic that emerges as the result of the representation of scientific or religious ideals, for psychoanalysis there is another ethic, which thanks to the manifestations of the psychopathology enables questioning that ethic which insists on ignoring the unconscious trying to neglect its relevance.

Psychoanalysis seeks to raise, to locate, a profound ethical dimension and not only to relieve the pain; it is an ethic aimed at the subjective level of a responsibility involved in the suffering itself. Getting involved with the very symptoms to a maximum extreme defines the orientation of our clinic. That is to say, the field of the enjoyment that derives from there is what determines the purpose of the cure. Therefore it is a treatment of the enjoyment and of an ethics meaning taking it in its contexts and in culture. When I speak I really think that my identity, my social function and my background seem to be well assured; but suddenly something arises and speaks, and

that is the unconscious, which is incorrect by definition. The desires of the unconscious are regularly and systematically not correct and not compliant, but the little life we have is held by those unconscious desires. The unconscious itself interprets when it returns a substance to a materiality, and not to the spirit or soul, since the unconscious refers to a material support.

Why is it currently necessary to question culture with and from psychoanalysis? Because it is clear that while they arose from the logical development proper to practice, they took into account the progress of the related sciences associated with the various changing circumstances of the social and political field. Believing in the unconscious is a certain way of being materialistic and not idealistic whatsoever. "The unconscious: it means what there is of significant in the real." In any case, in the real, there is undoubtedly the literalness that allows it to exist for each of us. The dejection mechanism is literally a mechanism linked to interpretative physiology proper to the literalness. The support of sex is rejected in the real, and there is no need for literalness in the real. There is where surely lies what explains our particular commitment in terms of the textual and our commitment to interpret what is proposed as textual.

The entrance to the language puts the body and the letter into play. If the body is made for speaking and consecrated to the word: is the letter meant to this incarnation? This incarnation that would be perhaps the return to a mythical origin of language? According to Lacan it is all about two orders that conjugate without ever being perfectly suited to each other, being the object of his reflection, his cut, their irreducible difference: the letter. If the body intervenes there it is only after submitting to the power of the letter.

Today in culture, medicine, religion and philosophy, a regulated relationship between body and enjoyment is promoted. The condition of health for the body seems to be the conservation of pleasure, in an attempt to pacify enjoyment. These precepts establish a matrix for pleasure-body, which psychoanalysis denounces as impossible. That the body itself may in some cases be presented as alien deserves to question ourselves about what we hear when we are told we have a body. Does the assumption of a body arise from a real, symbolic or imaginary operation? Or from a combination of the different orders between them? Those different approaches about the assumption of the body itself are not exclusive to one another. This allows us to assess and point out the variety of their clinical manifestations, their status as structural crossroads and the possible significance in the psychoanalytic cure.

The knowledge established today by the socio-political in our culture, strives to center this object in order to make it transparent to the speech. But one of the functions of psychoanalysis is to deny that operation and take us in "the between two" of the structure, which makes psychoanalysis an impossible science, the knowledge of

a not knowing, whose effects do not lack truth nor reality. The lack (fundamental dimension of desire), unfolds in both dimensions of truth and of knowing. At the level of truth, the lack is the inconceivable, the nothing, the unthinkable: what is absolutely excluded and lost when founded and the structure worked. To this loss, the subject of knowledge resists: the support of this resistance is the mirage of knowing. Knowing is what comes instead of the truth, after the loss of the object. The object of psychoanalysis is what was lost of the significant structure in the process of significance, but this lost item has no positive quality.

To analyze oneself and to research from psychoanalysis is to learn to interrogate what governs us without our conscience knowing, but of which our being registers: the subjective and social suffering. Questioning it, finding an answer, gets the best. Someone could say: "But then psychoanalysis is a treatment directed exclusively to alleviate the suffering of a subject, to make the symptoms of a subject go away". No. Psychoanalysis also tackles suffering at a cultural level. I would say that is essential, but not the only thing. The important thing is that we address not in a punctual but in an extensive view that "that" which comes and can be reflected in a high amount of anguish; since in a punctual approach in which we place the perplexing in a centrality and as something formal, we run the risk of erasing the uniqueness of that experience.

The important thing is to approach in transference to the way each subject tries to overcome the initial perplexity in order to enable the construction of their question. The subject is certain that what they feel means something, but they could not say what. When someone is willing to move forward in their analysis, this progress leads them not only to resolve the first thing, which undoubtedly appears to the subject as urgency and what constitutes their symptoms, their inhibitions, their anguish, but they also become aware of the benefits of reviewing the marks of their history and giving up the parasitic enjoyments for which they pay such an expensive price. Psychoanalysis is revolutionary for the subject and therefore in its function in culture.

Freud and Lacan allow us to question the current politics based on the observation of the unease in the culture dominated by the superego and the Father's law. In the West the brothers live eager to enjoy the service of an object whose market economy venerates its reign. No matter how unpredictable, erratic and submissive, it appears marked by cyclical and devastating crises. The capitalist discourse is the one which reigns, and the circulation of what is sold and bought offers the benefit of unlimited enjoyment. The contempt for human rights is one of the causes of public misfortunes and the government corruption, the current disparities of excessive wealth, the development of exclusion and poverty. With no values, there is no society, just a crowd: "people." Society needs a story in which everyone can recognize each other, a story that symbolically: speaks. It is all about the narrative of the law and in particular of the Constitution in the construction of a political society. To the extent that it is

agreed to recognize the part of the economy, the history, the sociology, religion, it is more difficult to admit and even to think of the possible part of the law for political work. It is something that seems to come later, once everything is over, to put things in order offering a legitimating speech. What can psychoanalysis contribute to these areas without making it a "conception of the world"?

It is true that our observation on politics and economics as Psychoanalysts has always been based on our clinical practice. But let's not forget that the classical question in political sciences of the field of social harmony refers to them as those of the symptom. What remains of politics from there? Does it concern to those who follow a leader or a master, who they want to continue idolizing in the Freudian sense of the word, by themselves? The symbols of power are certainly struck by this curse that hangs over the command and its inspiring ideologies, which now appear devalued by the criterion of a collective satisfaction as whimsical as fleeting.

It is necessary to accept the moral crisis of politics that has been affecting society. A deep abyss appears between the subjects and its elites, which produces distrust towards all the holders of power, and in particular towards institutional actors or supporters of political life. The question is whether this disenchantment, this breach of the trust pact is totally new, irreversible, or punctual. Maybe we should assume that this is not a fatality inherent in the operating principles of the new "world village", and admit that we need to look in our history and into our political tradition at the structuring elements of a necessary re-foundation. The real is the stumbling block towards which we go quickly, and we seem not to be able to keep it together with our great narrative, our imagination and the strength of the symbolic as the sole bearer of the possibly effective.

When considering morality as exposed to the risks of science or science exposed to the risks of morality (either secular or religious), the unconscious dimension of thought is questioned. The psychopathology of everyday life, dreams, symptoms or other formations of the unconscious can be interpreted as those points or break lines that, without the awareness of the conscious subject, express and frustrate all the fantasies of the homogeneous totality. But our responsibility as psychoanalysts is not to withdraw from the citizen debate. The idea is to avoid being monopolized by the very political institution we are part of. But we have to be warned that in this correct concern for a policy for psychoanalysis we also run the risk of putting it on the side of the imaginary and ideal.

For that it is necessary to question our passions. The great Rationalists, such as Spinoza, Descartes and Hume, met and analyzed passions, trying to channel them for the welfare of man. In Descartes the passions of the soul are those of a body excluded from the cogito, a body that returns disturbed in the figures that the subjectivity imposes over speech. In his Treaty of Passions, he admits they are brutal and sudden

impulses that assail us, but he does not advise to eliminate them, but to understand them to be able to live them with paused intensity. He recognizes that they are good by nature and we should just avoid their misuses or excesses. Therefore there are to be soothed with the help of a human auxiliary reason, without ever extinguishing them, not to mention ignore them.

For Spinoza, passions are conditions that keep us alive, willing, tough, and make us persist in our existence. Living means always getting passionate at everything and about everything, it is the energy that makes us endure. "Subsequently, the man is necessarily subjected to his passions." Both Descartes and Spinoza judged passions, then, as slaves and weaknesses of the soul that were to be submitted to the care of the supreme goddess Reason.

Instead, David Hume argues that it is not philosophically serious to speak of a struggle between passion and reason: "The reason is, and should only be, a slave to passions and can wish for no other job than serving them and obeying them." That is the essence of Hume's naturalism. Is it freedom for the debauchery of passions? Not at all, as Hume argues that passions are natural, restrained, rational feelings, and the reason itself is a faculty that passion has to infer, lock and link what we suffer or experience. It is Hume's critique of the traditional opposition between reason and passion.

For Hegel, in the *Phenomenology of the spirit*, the focus was the conscious exploration in the shady territory of the feelings of man. The Self cannot be understood without the passions that sustain and animate it. Whereas nothing great can be done in the world without passion, as Hegel states, he subordinates passions to diabolic and malevolent ghosts, to realize the ultimate purposes of the Spirit. Marx tried to correct this moralist or transcendent finalism of Hegel's, stating that passion was the supreme energy of man, which leads him to the objective realization of himself. Passion, thus, becomes the engine of history and change, the decisive and enraged protagonist of revolutions. However, both Hegel and Marx had a somewhat abstract conception of passion. Some argue that one day it would be necessary to write a critique of pure passion.

But as psychoanalysts we know that passion has no endogenous cause. For Lacan "the fundamental passions" are love, hate and ignorance (of speaking without knowing what is being said). In the work of our teachers, the language is explicit when they propose a discourse of the unconscious. The subject is different from the self and makes use of its fragments. It does so by splitting the imaginary unit into significant elements that could be articulated in symptoms. It's a complex movement between: 1) the meeting of the desire of the subject by the unconscious and 2) that self's passion for the imaginary and alienating unity which is precisely the image of the other.

But the subject's passion is established in the act of speaking, and it meets the passion of the signifier that supports it. The passions speak in the resolution to take the word.

In 1973 on Television Lacan says that "the simple extraction of passions of the soul, as Saint Thomas names more precisely those affections, Platon's resection of these passions on the model of body: head, heart, even, as επιθυμία (desire) says, or over-heart is it not the testimony already of what is inevitable for their approach, the need to tackle them through the body, which I state not to be affected other than by the structure? "

Logic seems to exalt rationality forgetting that passions of society and political economy create reformist passions for social changes. Proof of this is the welcome and necessary contemporary revolution of feminism. But not all passions are inevitable, and they cannot be explained only as expressions of the death drive. It is also up to society and political economy to think of affection in its relation to the language of passions.

If the effects of everything Freud discovered are consequences of the fact that we are speaking beings, which restores us the legitimacy for our act of intervening as we owe to that place: to remember that the difference of places, the loss of enjoyment and incompleteness are always admissible. Although the foundation is in the realm of the real, in the meaning chain the categories suggested by Lacan of insistence, persistence, consistency and ex-sistence, are determined by the order of a logical temporality. All are identifiable in the grammatical structure of the sentence, which reproduce in the breath and in the phoné; and also identify themselves in the temporal course of thought, with its fullness, its pauses, its emptiness, its hesitations, its obstacles, its delays and its outbursts. The analysis is nothing other than what is said in an analysis and that the only resistance to confession of desire is due exclusively to the incompatibility of the wish with the speech .

Can then the subject and the current society withstand the analytical act? They can, if we are able to restore the impotence of speech and restore the truth in its function. For this, Lacan suggested us the symptom, which has a revolutionary effect. The symptom is the irruption of an irreconcilable enjoyment that forces a renewal of the social bond, to a cultural invention and a mobilization of all sublimation resources. Let us then place our practice between the subject and the knowledge. There is a flaw in knowledge without which the orientation towards the Real would be impossible. The examples used by Lacan to shed light on the notion of impossibility can be useful. The discourse of the analyst produces another discourse than that of the Master and can only do so by restoring the subject in his relationship with speech and language. Lacan in Encore named it "change of speech ". A hysterization as a change, which produces a

transformation, which in turn shows that love manifests itself in each change of discourse.

Whatever the merits and efforts by some intellectuals and university academics, they can't keep ignoring a century of research and work on the Freudian unconscious, a century of conceptualization of psychoanalysis. It is up to us as psychoanalysts, for the unconscious to be taken into account, its discourse, its desire, its subject, all categories perceived as below the limits of the politically correct. It is the practice of the unconscious what makes it possible to address these questions with much more disjunction than what is allowed by the dominant discourses occurring upstream or downstream politics. Freudian ethics must intervene.

Given this ideological progress of a pseudo-science that relies on statistics and having a plurality of psychotherapeutic practices, let us remember that for the subject the relationship with the object is not immediate. The enjoyment should not be mistaken with the pleasures that these practices promise since it (the enjoyment), intertwines with the unconscious desire preventing a satisfaction that can bring some fulfilling object. The real of enjoyment bases a reorientation of our practice and rejects all ontology. Without knowing, the subject who suffers demands to know about the enjoyment and not a fullness of impossible pleasure. In 1974, Lacan said an analysis is the artificial lung thanks to which we try to ensure what we need to find in terms of the enjoyment in speaking so that the story continues.

Psychoanalysis is a response to the pain and suffering of each one of those who demand it in their social and political status. The symptom, the anguish, the inhibitions, the pains of which the subject accuses suffering, are different manifestations that indicate when the subject, the one who suffers, is subject to some command (individual or social), to something that from the Other works as what he cannot question, what he cannot speak about.

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[erattin952@gmail.com](mailto:erattin952@gmail.com)

+59899211377